AI security: App and agent security

Sefism.

A to Z

Glossary

Every concept in this sheet, plus the smaller terms it uses. Select a concept to open its card.

A
Agent loop
A loop where the model asks for a tool call, code runs it, the result returns to the context, and the model decides again.
Authentication and authorisation
Authentication checks who someone is; authorisation checks what they may do.
C
Classic web weaknesses in AI apps
Injection, cross-site scripting and broken access control, now often arriving through model output instead of a form field.
Context assembly
The text an app builds for the model: system prompt, history, retrieved documents, tool descriptions and results, and the user's message.
D
Defence in depth
Stacking independent controls so one failure does not become a breach: identity, scoped data, narrow tools, encoding, guards, limits, logs and a kill switch.
I
Instructions and data in one channel
A model reads instructions and data as the same stream of text and decides by probability which parts to follow.
L
Least privilege
Each person, service, agent and tool gets only the access its job needs, for only as long as it needs it.
Lethal trifecta
Simon Willison's name for three capabilities that together let an injection steal data: private data, untrusted content and a way to communicate out.
N
Non-determinism
The same input can give different outputs across runs and model versions.
P
Practice target app
A small LLM app you own: a local or spend-capped model, a system prompt, retrieval over your own documents and two harmless tools.
R
Retrieval permissions
Filtering retrieval by who is asking, in the query itself, and controlling who can write to indexed sources.
Rules of engagement
Written permission and scope for a test: which systems, methods, harm types, rates, cost limits, data handling, times and escalation contacts.
S
Secrets management
Keeping keys, passwords and tokens in a secrets manager or server-side environment, narrowly scoped, rotated and out of code, prompts and logs.
Server-side request forgery
Tricking a server into fetching an address the attacker chooses, such as an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint.
T
Threat modelling (four questions)
A structured way to find risks early by answering four questions: what are we working on, what can go wrong, what are we going to do about it, and did we do a good job?
Trust boundary
A line where data or control passes between parts that deserve different trust, such as the internet and your server.
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